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T
his brief examines the potential of
automatic IRAs to improve retirement
security for low- and moderate-wage
workers. The results, based on the
Urban Institute’s microsimulation model,
show that automatic IRAs can significantly
increase retirement plan coverage and eco-
nomic security for low-income retirees, at little
cost to business or the federal government.
Automatic IRA Proposal
Many Americans fail to save for retirement.
About 40 percent of all wage and salary work-
ers ages 25 to 59 in 2009 worked in jobs that
didn’t offer retirement plans (Butrica and
Johnson 2010). Another 16 percent of workers
with offers did not participate (Butrica and
Johnson 2010). And many people—particu-
larly those with limited resources—withdraw
funds from their 401(k)s and IRAs during
their working lives, and even cash them out
completely. Butrica, Zedlewski, and Issa
(2010) find that 8 percent of retirement
account owners made at least one withdrawal
between 2004 and 2005. Withdrawals were
more likely among African Americans, those
without college degrees, and those with little
or no assets.
Many workers eligible for retirement plans
do not participate simply because they never
bother to enroll. Increasingly, employers are
overcoming this inertia by automatically
enrolling new employees. The early results are
promising: many studies document much
higher participation in retirement plans for
which participation is the default rather than an
opt-in choice (Beshears et al. 2009; Choi et al.
2004; Madrian and Shea 2001). But automatic
enrollment does not help workers whose
employers do not offer plans.
Program on
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Nearly a third of Social Security beneficiaries age 65 or older depend on the program for 90 percent or more of their total income
(Social Security Administration 2010), a worrisome statistic because Social Security was not designed to be retirees’ sole source of
income. About half of seniors almost entirely dependent on Social Security received less than $15,000 in income in 2008 (Social
Security Administration 2010). One possible way to improve retirement security that has been advanced by experts across the 
political spectrum is to require employers that don’t offer retirement plans to set up individual retirement accounts (IRAs) for their
employees and automatically deposit a portion of pay into them.
One possible way to
improve retirement
security is to require
employers that don’t
offer retirement plans
to set up individual
retirement accounts
for employees and
automatically deposit
a portion of pay.
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•Proposed automatic IRA plans could increase
benefit coverage and economic security for 
low-income retirees, at little cost to business 
or government.
•For retirees in the bottom income quartile, yearly
incomes could increase 18 percent, or $3,000.
•Automatic IRAs could boost retirement incomes
for up to half of the lowest-income workers,
though most would still struggle financially.
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The automatic IRA, conceived by Mark
Iwry of the Brookings Institution and David
John of the Heritage Foundation, could boost
retirement savings for millions of workers not
offered employer-sponsored retirement plans
(Iwry and John 2007). The proposal calls for
employers with more than 10 workers that do
not offer retirement plans to set up IRAs for
their employees. Employers would automati-
cally deduct a percentage of workers’ pay and
deposit it into their IRAs, but employers
would not be required to contribute them-
selves. Employees could opt out of this retire-
ment savings deduction or change the
amount deducted. Automatic IRAs would be
provided by the same private financial institu-
tions that currently offer IRAs and be subject
to the same contribution limits and regula-
tions as existing IRAs.
Several bills have been introduced in
Congress to create automatic IRAs. Some
stipulated that workers participating in an
automatic IRA or 401(k) would have their
federal saver’s credit automatically deposited
into their retirement savings account. The
saver’s credit uses federal tax credits to match
low- and moderate-income workers’ contri-
butions to their retirement savings accounts.
Currently, however, the saver’s credit is nonre-
fundable, so low-income people without any
tax liability would not benefit. To address this
shortcoming, some automatic IRA bills
would expand the saver’s credit by making it
fully refundable.
The Obama administration has advocated
creating automatic IRAs and expanding the
saver’s credit to help low- and moderate-
income families build retirement savings.
Although the automatic IRA was included in
President Obama’s FY2012 budget request,
the expanded saver’s credit was dropped
(Gale and John 2011). 
Modeling the Automatic IRA
To assess the potential impact on future retirees’
incomes, we model the automatic IRA and the
proposed changes to the saver’s credit using the
Urban Institute’s Dynamic Simulation of
Income Model (DYNASIM3). DYNASIM3
projects the major sources of wealth and
income at retirement age, including pensions
from employer-sponsored defined benefit
(DB) plans, cash balance plans, and retirement
accounts (defined contribution [DC] plans,
IRAs, and Keoghs). Starting information
about pension coverage on current and past
jobs, pension contribution rates, and account
balances comes from self-reported data in the
Survey of Income and Program Participation.
Numerous data sources and models are used to
project job changes, pension coverage, pension
participation, and pension contributions.
DYNASIM3 assumes that retirement accounts
and other financial assets are converted into
lifetime annuities, generating a fixed annual
stream of payments from retirement until
death. The model also estimates state and 
federal income taxes and the saver’s credit. For
a full description of DYNASIM3, see Favreault
and Smith (forthcoming).
We simulate automatic IRAs for workers
born between 1987 and 1996, under the
assumption that they first become available in
2012. Thus, the automatic IRA option would
be available to these workers for nearly their
entire careers. We follow them for 46 years
from age 25 until age 70 (between 2012 and
2066) and assign an automatic IRA to those
who would not otherwise be offered an
employer-sponsored retirement plan.
Because all versions of the original auto-
matic IRA proposal allow workers to decline
enrollment, we need to determine how many
might opt out of an IRA when automatically
enrolled. Automatic IRAs do not yet exist, so
there is no direct empirical evidence to
inform our models. To capture this uncer-
tainty, we consider two different scenarios—a
high-enrollment scenario and low-enrollment
scenario. The high-enrollment scenario sets
the target average participation rate at 70 per-
cent, based on Nessmith, Utkus, and Young’s
(2007) estimate of 401(k) participation rates
under autoenrollment without an employer
match (since employers would not match
automatic IRA deposits).
Alternatively, automatic enrollment may
not affect participation much, so it may be
more realistic to tie the average participation
rate in automatic IRAs to current DC plan
participation. According to data from the
National Compensation Survey, 77 percent of
workers offered DC plans participate (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2007). Even and
MacPherson (2005) estimate that employer
matches increase participation by about 30
percentage points, suggesting that participa-
tion in DC plans with no match would be
only 47 percent. Additionally, workers less
inclined to save for retirement tend to select
jobs that don’t offer retirement plans
(Karamcheva and Sanzenbacher 2010), reduc-
ing likely enrollment rates in automatic IRAs.
Accounting for this behavior suggests a target
average participation rate of about 36 percent
under the low-enrollment scenario. We use
DYNASIM’s existing models of DC participa-
tion to distribute the overall participation tar-
gets across individuals by their prior savings
behavior, age, sex, marital status, number of
dependents, earnings, and job tenure.
For workers predicted to participate in an
automatic IRA, the analysis uses DYNASIM’s
model of DC contributions to estimate how
much they will contribute, subject to statutory
IRA contribution limits. The model parame-
ters are adjusted slightly to produce somewhat
higher contributions under the high scenario
than under the low scenario. We assume these
contributions come out of household spending
and do not offset other savings. The low- and
high-enrollment scenarios are intended to rep-
resent the lower and upper bounds of possible
outcomes in a world with automatic IRAs.
As with DC plans in DYNASIM, we
assume that automatic IRAs are invested in
stock and bond portfolios that vary by age
and risk tolerance according to Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF) data on asset allo-
cations.1 Every year, DYNASIM3 rebalances
the portfolios according to the allocation
strategy for the individual’s attained age and
risk-tolerance categories. A few workers
(mostly young workers and those with small
balances) are simulated to cash out retirement
account balances at job separation.
We also model the impact of an expanded
saver’s credit. Under current law, the saver’s
credit provides a tax credit of up to $1,000
($2,000 if married filing jointly) for low- and
moderate-income taxpayers who contribute to
a retirement savings account. The credit equals
50 percent, 20 percent, or 10 percent of contri-
butions, depending on taxable income, for
those with incomes as high as $28,250 ($56,500
for joint filers) in 2011. Following the
President’s previous budget requests, we
assume that the saver’s credit would be reduced,
but fully refundable and available to more tax-
payers. We model a 50 percent credit up to
$500 ($1,000 if married filing jointly) for tax-
payers with income up to $32,500 ($65,000 for
joint filers). We assume the match rates remain
constant over the projection period, but we
adjust the credit amounts and brackets for
changes in prices through 2020 and changes in
average wages after 2020, based on the Social
Security trustees’ intermediate-cost projections.
Automatic IRAs Can significantly
Increase Retirement Plan Coverage
Without automatic IRAs, nearly a quarter 
of people born between 1987 and 1996 will
not receive any retirement income from DB
pensions, DC plans, or IRAs when they reach
age 70 (table 1). Close to half of these GenYers
will receive at least $5,000 per person in
annual private retirement benefits at age 70
(measured in 2010 dollars).
Retirement security depends largely on
having a retirement plan. Consider those
retirees who will have the lowest incomes at
age 70. Nearly half will have no private retire-
ment benefits and only 8 percent will receive
annual benefits of $5,000 or more. By con-
trast, more than three-quarters of retirees with
the highest incomes at age 70 will have pri-
vate retirement benefits of at least $5,000. Just
more than a third of retirees will have worked
for 30 or more years in retirement plan jobs
between ages 25 and 65. About three-quarters
of these retirees will receive $5,000 or more in
3.
table 1. Percent of Individuals born 1987 to 1996 Receiving
Private Retirement benefits at Age 70 under the baseline 
(in the Absence of Auto IRAs), by Personal Characteristics
All 24 46
Household income quartile at age 70
Bottom 47 8
Second 24 37
Third 15 62
Top 10 77
employment and retirement plan history
≥ 30 years of employment, ≤ 10 years in retirement plan job (16%) 50 22
≥ 30 years of employment in retirement plan job (35%) 4 74
no
beneFIts 
AnnUAL
beneFIts
≥ $5,000
Source: DYNASIM3 projections.
Notes: Sample excludes individuals with incomes in the bottom and top 1 percent of the income distribution. Population
shares are reported in parentheses. Financial amounts are measured in 2010 dollars.
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One in six retirees
will have worked for
at least 30 years but
spent no more than
10 years in jobs that
offered retirement
plans. Half will have
no private retirement
benefits. Automatic
IRAs could help 
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retirement plans that
could boost their
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The automatic IRA, conceived by Mark
Iwry of the Brookings Institution and David
John of the Heritage Foundation, could boost
retirement savings for millions of workers not
offered employer-sponsored retirement plans
(Iwry and John 2007). The proposal calls for
employers with more than 10 workers that do
not offer retirement plans to set up IRAs for
their employees. Employers would automati-
cally deduct a percentage of workers’ pay and
deposit it into their IRAs, but employers
would not be required to contribute them-
selves. Employees could opt out of this retire-
ment savings deduction or change the
amount deducted. Automatic IRAs would be
provided by the same private financial institu-
tions that currently offer IRAs and be subject
to the same contribution limits and regula-
tions as existing IRAs.
Several bills have been introduced in
Congress to create automatic IRAs. Some
stipulated that workers participating in an
automatic IRA or 401(k) would have their
federal saver’s credit automatically deposited
into their retirement savings account. The
saver’s credit uses federal tax credits to match
low- and moderate-income workers’ contri-
butions to their retirement savings accounts.
Currently, however, the saver’s credit is nonre-
fundable, so low-income people without any
tax liability would not benefit. To address this
shortcoming, some automatic IRA bills
would expand the saver’s credit by making it
fully refundable.
The Obama administration has advocated
creating automatic IRAs and expanding the
saver’s credit to help low- and moderate-
income families build retirement savings.
Although the automatic IRA was included in
President Obama’s FY2012 budget request,
the expanded saver’s credit was dropped
(Gale and John 2011). 
Modeling the Automatic IRA
To assess the potential impact on future retirees’
incomes, we model the automatic IRA and the
proposed changes to the saver’s credit using the
Urban Institute’s Dynamic Simulation of
Income Model (DYNASIM3). DYNASIM3
projects the major sources of wealth and
income at retirement age, including pensions
from employer-sponsored defined benefit
(DB) plans, cash balance plans, and retirement
accounts (defined contribution [DC] plans,
IRAs, and Keoghs). Starting information
about pension coverage on current and past
jobs, pension contribution rates, and account
balances comes from self-reported data in the
Survey of Income and Program Participation.
Numerous data sources and models are used to
project job changes, pension coverage, pension
participation, and pension contributions.
DYNASIM3 assumes that retirement accounts
and other financial assets are converted into
lifetime annuities, generating a fixed annual
stream of payments from retirement until
death. The model also estimates state and 
federal income taxes and the saver’s credit. For
a full description of DYNASIM3, see Favreault
and Smith (forthcoming).
We simulate automatic IRAs for workers
born between 1987 and 1996, under the
assumption that they first become available in
2012. Thus, the automatic IRA option would
be available to these workers for nearly their
entire careers. We follow them for 46 years
from age 25 until age 70 (between 2012 and
2066) and assign an automatic IRA to those
who would not otherwise be offered an
employer-sponsored retirement plan.
Because all versions of the original auto-
matic IRA proposal allow workers to decline
enrollment, we need to determine how many
might opt out of an IRA when automatically
enrolled. Automatic IRAs do not yet exist, so
there is no direct empirical evidence to
inform our models. To capture this uncer-
tainty, we consider two different scenarios—a
high-enrollment scenario and low-enrollment
scenario. The high-enrollment scenario sets
the target average participation rate at 70 per-
cent, based on Nessmith, Utkus, and Young’s
(2007) estimate of 401(k) participation rates
under autoenrollment without an employer
match (since employers would not match
automatic IRA deposits).
Alternatively, automatic enrollment may
not affect participation much, so it may be
more realistic to tie the average participation
rate in automatic IRAs to current DC plan
participation. According to data from the
National Compensation Survey, 77 percent of
workers offered DC plans participate (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2007). Even and
MacPherson (2005) estimate that employer
matches increase participation by about 30
percentage points, suggesting that participa-
tion in DC plans with no match would be
only 47 percent. Additionally, workers less
inclined to save for retirement tend to select
jobs that don’t offer retirement plans
(Karamcheva and Sanzenbacher 2010), reduc-
ing likely enrollment rates in automatic IRAs.
Accounting for this behavior suggests a target
average participation rate of about 36 percent
under the low-enrollment scenario. We use
DYNASIM’s existing models of DC participa-
tion to distribute the overall participation tar-
gets across individuals by their prior savings
behavior, age, sex, marital status, number of
dependents, earnings, and job tenure.
For workers predicted to participate in an
automatic IRA, the analysis uses DYNASIM’s
model of DC contributions to estimate how
much they will contribute, subject to statutory
IRA contribution limits. The model parame-
ters are adjusted slightly to produce somewhat
higher contributions under the high scenario
than under the low scenario. We assume these
contributions come out of household spending
and do not offset other savings. The low- and
high-enrollment scenarios are intended to rep-
resent the lower and upper bounds of possible
outcomes in a world with automatic IRAs.
As with DC plans in DYNASIM, we
assume that automatic IRAs are invested in
stock and bond portfolios that vary by age
and risk tolerance according to Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF) data on asset allo-
cations.1 Every year, DYNASIM3 rebalances
the portfolios according to the allocation
strategy for the individual’s attained age and
risk-tolerance categories. A few workers
(mostly young workers and those with small
balances) are simulated to cash out retirement
account balances at job separation.
We also model the impact of an expanded
saver’s credit. Under current law, the saver’s
credit provides a tax credit of up to $1,000
($2,000 if married filing jointly) for low- and
moderate-income taxpayers who contribute to
a retirement savings account. The credit equals
50 percent, 20 percent, or 10 percent of contri-
butions, depending on taxable income, for
those with incomes as high as $28,250 ($56,500
for joint filers) in 2011. Following the
President’s previous budget requests, we
assume that the saver’s credit would be reduced,
but fully refundable and available to more tax-
payers. We model a 50 percent credit up to
$500 ($1,000 if married filing jointly) for tax-
payers with income up to $32,500 ($65,000 for
joint filers). We assume the match rates remain
constant over the projection period, but we
adjust the credit amounts and brackets for
changes in prices through 2020 and changes in
average wages after 2020, based on the Social
Security trustees’ intermediate-cost projections.
Automatic IRAs Can significantly
Increase Retirement Plan Coverage
Without automatic IRAs, nearly a quarter 
of people born between 1987 and 1996 will
not receive any retirement income from DB
pensions, DC plans, or IRAs when they reach
age 70 (table 1). Close to half of these GenYers
will receive at least $5,000 per person in
annual private retirement benefits at age 70
(measured in 2010 dollars).
Retirement security depends largely on
having a retirement plan. Consider those
retirees who will have the lowest incomes at
age 70. Nearly half will have no private retire-
ment benefits and only 8 percent will receive
annual benefits of $5,000 or more. By con-
trast, more than three-quarters of retirees with
the highest incomes at age 70 will have pri-
vate retirement benefits of at least $5,000. Just
more than a third of retirees will have worked
for 30 or more years in retirement plan jobs
between ages 25 and 65. About three-quarters
of these retirees will receive $5,000 or more in
3.
table 1. Percent of Individuals born 1987 to 1996 Receiving
Private Retirement benefits at Age 70 under the baseline 
(in the Absence of Auto IRAs), by Personal Characteristics
All 24 46
Household income quartile at age 70
Bottom 47 8
Second 24 37
Third 15 62
Top 10 77
employment and retirement plan history
≥ 30 years of employment, ≤ 10 years in retirement plan job (16%) 50 22
≥ 30 years of employment in retirement plan job (35%) 4 74
no
beneFIts 
AnnUAL
beneFIts
≥ $5,000
Source: DYNASIM3 projections.
Notes: Sample excludes individuals with incomes in the bottom and top 1 percent of the income distribution. Population
shares are reported in parentheses. Financial amounts are measured in 2010 dollars.
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annual private retirement benefits at age 70.
However, one in six retirees will have worked
for 30 or more years but spent no more than
10 years in jobs that offered retirement plans.
Half of these retirees will have no private
retirement benefits at age 70. Automatic IRAs
could help these workers most, providing
them with retirement plans that could boost
their retirement incomes substantially.
A third of all adults born 1987 to 1996 will
be eligible to participate in an automatic IRA
in 2036 (when they are age 40 to 49, peak
earning years) because they are working in a
job that doesn’t offer a retirement plan (not
shown). In contrast, over half of these GenYers
will work for employers that offer DC plans.
Under the low-enrollment scenario, 36
percent of those eligible for automatic IRAs
will participate in 2036. Under the high-
enrollment scenario, participation rates will
reach 70 percent (figure 1). Participation rates
increase with earnings. Under the low sce-
nario, 11 percent of those eligible in the bot-
tom quarter of the earnings distribution will
participate in automatic IRAs, compared with
72 percent of those in the top quarter. Under
the high scenario, participation rates range
from 34 percent for the lowest eligible earners
to 98 percent for the highest earners.
Automatic IRAs Increase Incomes
Under the baseline (in the absence of auto-
matic IRAs), after-tax household incomes at
age 70 will average $65,000 (2010 dollars)
per person among adults born 1987 to 1996
(table 2). If automatic IRAs become avail-
able in 2012, their incomes will increase 3
percent overall under the low-enrollment
scenario and 5 percent under the high-
enrollment scenario. The effects on incomes
will vary significantly by work history,
income level, and private retirement benefits.
Relative to the baseline, the high-enrollment
scenario would raise average per person
income 10 percent at age 70 for retirees who
would not otherwise receive any private
retirement benefits. As expected, automatic
IRAs would provide the most help to adults
with low and moderate incomes, those with
limited plan coverage but strong work 
histories, and those without private retire-
ment benefits. Thus, the proposal seems to
have the largest impact on those it was
designed to target. Under the high-enroll-
ment scenario, retirees with incomes in the
second quarter of the distribution without
private retirement benefits would gain most
(15 percent) and retirees with $5,000 or more
in annual benefits who participated for
many years in their employer’s retirement
plan would gain least (2 percent).
Figure 2 shows that automatic IRAs would
make about a third of adults under the low sce-
nario and half of adults under the high scenario
better off in retirement (i.e., increase after-tax
incomes at age 70 by at least 2 percent). Retirees
in the second quarter of the income distribu-
tion are most likely to gain—44 percent of
those under the low scenario and 61 percent of
those under the high scenario. In contrast,
retirees in the top quarter of the distribution are
less likely to experience income gains—only 29
percent of those under the low scenario and 41
percent of those under the high scenario.
Automatic IRAs will boost retirees’ incomes,
but by enough to significantly improve retire-
ment security? Figure 3 shows the percentage
increase in age-70 incomes among those with
gains under the high scenario. For the roughly
half of retirees in the bottom income quartile
and the three-fifths of retirees in the second
income quartile who will gain, mean incomes
will increase 18 percent. On average, these gains
amount to $3,000 per year for those in the bot-
tom quarter and $6,000 per year for those in
the second quarter. Even with these income
gains, age-70 incomes would average only
about $20,000 for those in bottom quartile and
$39,000 for those in the second quartile— con-
siderably less than what retirees in the top half
of the income distribution would have in the
absence of automatic IRAs. (The low-enroll-
ment scenario generates similar income boosts
for those with gains, but fewer retirees would
gain because participation rates are lower.)
Our simulations predict that some auto-
matic IRA enrollees would contribute little to
their accounts each period, others would bor-
row from them or cash them out before retire-
ment, and a few would earn poor investment
4. 5.
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Auto IRA: high-enrollment scenario
Auto IRA: low-enrollment scenario
All Bottom Second ird Top
36%
53%
35%
44%
29%
54%
61%
38%
55%
41%
Quartile of Household Income at Age 70 under the Baseline
Figure 2. share Who Gain Income at Age 70 between the baseline
(in the Absence of Auto IRAs) and Alternative Auto IRA scenarios
Source: DYNASIM3 projections.
Notes: Sample excludes individuals with incomes in the bottom and top 1 percent of the income distribution. 
Household income is after taxes.
table 2. Mean Household Income at Age 70 and Percent Increase between baseline 
(in the Absence of Auto IRAs) and Alternative Auto IRA scenarios by Private Retirement 
benefit Receipt at Age 70 (2010 $)
Source: DYNASIM3 projections.
Notes: Sample excludes individuals with incomes in the bottom and top 1 percent of the income distribution. Household income is measured per person, after taxes, and in 2010 dollars. 
All 65 3 5 41 5 10 91 3 4
Household income quartile at age 70
Bottom 16 6 13 15 7 13 20 0 5
Second 33 6 12 33 6 15 35 3 6
Third 59 5 7 58 9 14 60 3 5
Top 150 3 3 154 4 6 151 2 3
employment and retirement plan history
≥ 30 years of employment, ≤ 10 years in retirement plan job 63 6 11 55 5 13 87 6 9
≥ 30 years of employment in retirement plan job 84 2 4 44 5 7 99 1 2
no beneFIts 
UnDeR 
tHe bAseLIneALL
Income
under
baseline
($000)
Percent Increase
AnnUAL beneFIts
≥ $5,000 UnDeR 
tHe bAseLIne
Low
scenario
High
scenario
Income
under
baseline
($000)
Percent Increase
Low
scenario
High
scenario
Income
under
baseline
($000)
Percent Increase
Low
scenario
High
scenario
Auto IRA: high-enrollment scenario
Auto IRA: low-enrollment scenario
All Bottom Second ird Top
36%
70%
11%
26%
72%
34%
66%
43%
90%
98%
Quartile of Earnings under the Baseline
Source: DYNASIM3 projections.
Notes: Sample excludes individuals with incomes in the bottom and top 1 percent of the income distribution.
Figure 1. Participation Rates in 2036 among Individuals 
born 1987 to 1996 and offered Automatic IRAs
annual private retirement benefits at age 70.
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for 30 or more years but spent no more than
10 years in jobs that offered retirement plans.
Half of these retirees will have no private
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could help these workers most, providing
them with retirement plans that could boost
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earning years) because they are working in a
job that doesn’t offer a retirement plan (not
shown). In contrast, over half of these GenYers
will work for employers that offer DC plans.
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scenario and 5 percent under the high-
enrollment scenario. The effects on incomes
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Relative to the baseline, the high-enrollment
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designed to target. Under the high-enroll-
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(15 percent) and retirees with $5,000 or more
in annual benefits who participated for
many years in their employer’s retirement
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tion are most likely to gain—44 percent of
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retirees in the top quarter of the distribution are
less likely to experience income gains—only 29
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and the three-fifths of retirees in the second
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amount to $3,000 per year for those in the bot-
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the second quarter. Even with these income
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siderably less than what retirees in the top half
of the income distribution would have in the
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ment scenario generates similar income boosts
for those with gains, but fewer retirees would
gain because participation rates are lower.)
Our simulations predict that some auto-
matic IRA enrollees would contribute little to
their accounts each period, others would bor-
row from them or cash them out before retire-
ment, and a few would earn poor investment
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Auto IRA: high-enrollment scenario
Auto IRA: low-enrollment scenario
All Bottom Second ird Top
36%
53%
35%
44%
29%
54%
61%
38%
55%
41%
Quartile of Household Income at Age 70 under the Baseline
Figure 2. share Who Gain Income at Age 70 between the baseline
(in the Absence of Auto IRAs) and Alternative Auto IRA scenarios
Source: DYNASIM3 projections.
Notes: Sample excludes individuals with incomes in the bottom and top 1 percent of the income distribution. 
Household income is after taxes.
table 2. Mean Household Income at Age 70 and Percent Increase between baseline 
(in the Absence of Auto IRAs) and Alternative Auto IRA scenarios by Private Retirement 
benefit Receipt at Age 70 (2010 $)
Source: DYNASIM3 projections.
Notes: Sample excludes individuals with incomes in the bottom and top 1 percent of the income distribution. Household income is measured per person, after taxes, and in 2010 dollars. 
All 65 3 5 41 5 10 91 3 4
Household income quartile at age 70
Bottom 16 6 13 15 7 13 20 0 5
Second 33 6 12 33 6 15 35 3 6
Third 59 5 7 58 9 14 60 3 5
Top 150 3 3 154 4 6 151 2 3
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70%
11%
26%
72%
34%
66%
43%
90%
98%
Quartile of Earnings under the Baseline
Source: DYNASIM3 projections.
Notes: Sample excludes individuals with incomes in the bottom and top 1 percent of the income distribution.
Figure 1. Participation Rates in 2036 among Individuals 
born 1987 to 1996 and offered Automatic IRAs
returns, potentially limiting the program’s
impact on retirement incomes. However, addi-
tional simulations that we ran showed that
these factors do not significantly reduce the
effectiveness of automatic IRAs. Retirement
incomes would increase slightly—particularly
for retirees with the lowest incomes—if no
workers cashed out any of their automatic IRA
balances or if all contributed at least 6 percent
of wages, but outcomes would not substan-
tially improve. Guaranteeing workers a 3 per-
cent real rate of return, instead of having them
invest their accounts in risky stocks and bonds,
would slightly reduce overall retirement
incomes. No enrollees would lose any money,
but no one would reap the big windfalls some-
times generated by the stock market.
Policy Implications
Requiring employers that don’t offer retire-
ment plans to establish IRAs for their work-
ers and automatically direct a portion of pay
into their accounts is one of the most prom-
ising ways to improve retirement security for
low- and moderate-wage workers. Our
results suggest that if implemented early in
their careers, automatic IRAs would boost
retirement incomes for between a third and 
a half of workers in the bottom quarter of 
the income distribution at age 70. Between
two-fifths and three-fifths of workers in the
second quarter of the age-70 income distri-
bution would also benefit.
Although average retirement incomes
would increase nearly a fifth for low- and
moderate-income adults who would benefit
from the program, they would remain rela-
tively low. The impact of automatic IRAs
would not be larger because workers in jobs
that do not offer retirement plans tend to have
lower earnings and more intermittent work
histories than those in jobs with employer-
sponsored retirement plans. Therefore, even
with a relatively high contribution rate, their
ability to significantly increase their savings is
constrained by their low earnings and income.
Nonetheless, any additional savings created by
automatic IRAs, no matter how small, will
improve retirement security (as long as the
new savings doesn’t offset other savings).
Another positive side-effect of automatic IRAs
is that they could improve financial literacy by
introducing more people—especially those
with low incomes—to financial instruments
that demonstrate the value of saving.
This improvement to retirement security
would not cost businesses or government
much, an important consideration given the
competitive pressures confronting employers
and the growing size of the federal debt.
Employers would not contribute to the new
accounts, and the administrative burden
seems modest, since financial institutions
would manage the accounts. Because auto-
matic IRA contributions would be tax
deferred (like traditional IRA contributions)
and some low-income savers would receive
small tax credits, the proposal would cost the
federal government some tax revenue. But it
would help spread the tax benefits currently
received by many high-wage workers on their
401(k) contributions across income groups. 
It is difficult to project income 45 years, so
our estimates of how automatic IRAs might
promote retirement security are necessarily
uncertain. One of the major unknowns
involves whether low-wage workers will
choose to remain in the program after they
have been automatically enrolled. Workers
struggling to make ends meet may object to
voluntary payroll deductions, even if they
would raise future retirement incomes.
Evidence from firms that automatically enroll
workers into 401(k) plans is encouraging,
however. About three-quarters of automatic
enrollees with earnings less than $30,000 per
year continue to contribute to their plans
(Nessmith, Utkus, and Young 2007). Of
course, firms typically match their employees’
401(k) contributions, increasing the financial
incentive to participate, so outcomes may be
less favorable for automatic IRAs. 
Even if automatic IRAs prove to be
wildly successful, however, low-wage work-
ers will continue to receive the bulk of their
retirement income from Social Security.
Policymakers working to improve the finan-
cial solvency of Social Security should 
consider options that protect low-income
seniors. Currently, Social Security benefits
replace a larger share of career earnings for
lower-wage earners than for higher-wage 
earners. Reform proposals that maintain these
relatively high replacement rates for lower
earners would preserve benefits for the most
vulnerable. A new Social Security minimum
benefit, enacted alone or as part of a larger
reform package, also could protect low-
income retirees (Favreault et al. 2007).
Beyond this, policymakers could take
additional steps to strengthen the social safety
net. One option would be to reform and
strengthen Supplemental Security Income
(SSI), a means-tested program that provides
cash benefits to poor seniors and people with
disabilities. Increasing the asset limit (set in
1972) to reflect cost-of-living changes and
boosting the maximum benefit to the poverty
threshold would allow more seniors to qualify
for SSI and raise their annual benefits.
Expanding SSI would enable the program to
fulfill its mission of protecting older and dis-
abled adults from economic hardship.
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Source: Source: DYNASIM3 projections.
Notes: Sample excludes individuals with incomes in the bottom and top 1 percent of the income distribution, 
and is further restricted to those whose household income is projected to increase by at least 2 percent between the baseline
and auto IRA high scenarios. Household income is measured per person, after taxes, and in thousands of 2010 dollars.
note
1.  Our analysis uses a multinomial logit equation 
to assign individuals one of five possible asset 
allocations (no stock, 20 percent stock, 50
percent stock, 80 percent stock, and 100 percent
stock). The equation is estimated on pooled 
1998 to 2007 SCF data and controls for age, 
education, and marital status. 
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struggling to make ends meet may object to
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(SSI), a means-tested program that provides
cash benefits to poor seniors and people with
disabilities. Increasing the asset limit (set in
1972) to reflect cost-of-living changes and
boosting the maximum benefit to the poverty
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for SSI and raise their annual benefits.
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Source: Source: DYNASIM3 projections.
Notes: Sample excludes individuals with incomes in the bottom and top 1 percent of the income distribution, 
and is further restricted to those whose household income is projected to increase by at least 2 percent between the baseline
and auto IRA high scenarios. Household income is measured per person, after taxes, and in thousands of 2010 dollars.
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T
his brief examines the potential of
automatic IRAs to improve retirement
security for low- and moderate-wage
workers. The results, based on the
Urban Institute’s microsimulation model,
show that automatic IRAs can significantly
increase retirement plan coverage and eco-
nomic security for low-income retirees, at little
cost to business or the federal government.
Automatic IRA Proposal
Many Americans fail to save for retirement.
About 40 percent of all wage and salary work-
ers ages 25 to 59 in 2009 worked in jobs that
didn’t offer retirement plans (Butrica and
Johnson 2010). Another 16 percent of workers
with offers did not participate (Butrica and
Johnson 2010). And many people—particu-
larly those with limited resources—withdraw
funds from their 401(k)s and IRAs during
their working lives, and even cash them out
completely. Butrica, Zedlewski, and Issa
(2010) find that 8 percent of retirement
account owners made at least one withdrawal
between 2004 and 2005. Withdrawals were
more likely among African Americans, those
without college degrees, and those with little
or no assets.
Many workers eligible for retirement plans
do not participate simply because they never
bother to enroll. Increasingly, employers are
overcoming this inertia by automatically
enrolling new employees. The early results are
promising: many studies document much
higher participation in retirement plans for
which participation is the default rather than an
opt-in choice (Beshears et al. 2009; Choi et al.
2004; Madrian and Shea 2001). But automatic
enrollment does not help workers whose
employers do not offer plans.
Program on
Retirement Policy
Nearly a third of Social Security beneficiaries age 65 or older depend on the program for 90 percent or more of their total income
(Social Security Administration 2010), a worrisome statistic because Social Security was not designed to be retirees’ sole source of
income. About half of seniors almost entirely dependent on Social Security received less than $15,000 in income in 2008 (Social
Security Administration 2010). One possible way to improve retirement security that has been advanced by experts across the 
political spectrum is to require employers that don’t offer retirement plans to set up individual retirement accounts (IRAs) for their
employees and automatically deposit a portion of pay into them.
One possible way to
improve retirement
security is to require
employers that don’t
offer retirement plans
to set up individual
retirement accounts
for employees and
automatically deposit
a portion of pay.
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•Proposed automatic IRA plans could increase
benefit coverage and economic security for 
low-income retirees, at little cost to business 
or government.
•For retirees in the bottom income quartile, yearly
incomes could increase 18 percent, or $3,000.
•Automatic IRAs could boost retirement incomes
for up to half of the lowest-income workers,
though most would still struggle financially.
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